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Why Don’t Docs Digitize?







Reformers in the US have earmarked substantial resources towards encour-
aging the adoption of electronic health records (EHRs). However, studies have
yet to explain why physicians resist adoption and why the investments resulting
from a policy push may prove ineffective for improving the efficiency of health-
care delivery. I theorize that health information technology (IT) facilitates
certain outcomes that bolster industry-level efficiency, but that the conven-
tional, “fee-for-service” financing of primary care prevents many physicians
from appropriating these benefits. Those physicians financing care delivery
from a prepaid premium, on the other hand, are positioned to internalize what
are otherwise external economies attendant to health IT investment. I find
strong statistical support for this theory in a unique panel of US-practicing
primary care physicians that allows us to examine health IT adoption as far
back as 2001—long before it garnered policymakers’ attention. The results
imply that reformers should focus not on encouraging health IT adoption per
se, but on reforms that enable physicians to internalize what are presently
socialized benefits.
I. Introduction
The promise of health information technology (IT) for increasing the efficiency of
healthcare delivery in the US has spurred a great deal of interest from policymakers,
most recently in the form of the Health Information Technology for Economic and
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Clinical Health (HITECH) Act—a $21.8 billion carve-out of the Obama administra-
tion’s economic stimulus package. Reformers justify the allocation of these resources
by blaming the slow diffusion of health IT for the poor performance of the healthcare
industry, marked by skyrocketing costs, high rates of medical errors, high infant mor-
tality, and below average life expectancies (Kaiser Family Foundation 2007). The
administration, citing a RAND Corporation study (Hillestad et al. 2005), points to
a projected annual savings of $81 billion from the effective deployment of health IT
systems. In short, policymakers believe that physicians will use health IT to provide
higher-quality care at lower costs. Therefore, they have embarked on an effort to spur
adoption through a series of incentive payments for those doctors reaching certain
targets for adoption and so-called “meaningful use.” By taking a closer look at which
doctors have already adopted health IT, this study suggests that policies that make
physicians beneficiaries of the effective deployment of the technology are preferred
to policies that simply pay doctors back for buying and installing the technology.
This study critiques current health IT policy by examining the adoption patterns
of a panel of US-practicing, primary care physicians (PCPs). The choice to restrict the
analysis to PCPs has both substantive and methodological justifications. From the
reformer’s perspective, the dearth of health IT investment is especially acute in the
non-hospital or “ambulatory” environment—medical offices—the organizational set-
tings from which patients seek primary care (DesRoches et al. 2008). This interests
researchers and policymakers since most office visits are to primary care providers,
not specialists. With respect to theory, the integrative nature of primary care makes
it the locus for many of the efficiency gains expected to arise from health IT. Finally,
health IT may need to be tailored or reconfigured especially for smaller-niche, spe-
cialist settings (Bates 2005). Therefore, from an empirical perspective, a constrained
focus on primary care eliminates unobserved sources of variation in the drivers of
health IT adoption.
PCPs access health IT through their medical practices. Some physicians report ac-
cess to the technology at least as far back as 2001. I argue that these “early adopters”
did so because they were affiliated with those few medical practices that could ac-
tually internalize what would otherwise be inappropriable, social returns to health
IT investments. This implies that there may be a less expensive way to encourage
adoption than by paying doctors to do so. Add to this our understanding of what is
required to establish a connection between IT investment and performance, namely a
set of concomitant investments in training and work redesign (Bresnahan, Brynjolf-
sson, and Hitt 2002, Brynjolfsson, Hitt, and Yang 2002), and the findings indicate
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that current policies are misdirected. This study instead calls for a policy framework
that makes more physicians and their practices beneficiaries of the effective use of
IT, encouraging adoption of the technology and its organizational complements by
those physicians most likely to leverage it effectively. In this way, it informs a very
active area for policymakers while contributing an economics-oriented perspective to
the small set of existing studies of health IT diffusion.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II considers health IT’s benefits and
theorizes drivers of health IT investment. Section III provides empirical evidence in
support of the theory. The final section concludes by discussing the implications of
the estimates and by suggesting appropriate areas for follow-up study.
II. Background and Framework for Analysis
Health IT is the label applied to those IT applications employed in the healthcare
context whether the information being processed is clinical, financial, or administra-
tive in nature (Bower 2005). These applications frequently serve as components of
an electronic health record (EHR) system; however, an EHR system implies a high
level of inter-functional integration, interoperability, and coordination between indi-
vidual components of health IT. It is actually EHRs, not health IT per se, that are
expected to improve the performance of the healthcare industry. Nonetheless, the
adoption of health IT can be measured reliably and is a prerequisite to deploying
more comprehensive EHR systems.
There are a number of reasons why policymakers might suspect a link between
the deployment of health IT and improved performance. For starters, the sector ap-
pears to have opted out of the IT “revolution” that swept most other industries in
the US and brought measurable performance improvements in tow (Jorgenson and
Stiroh 1999, Oliner and Sichel 2000, Porter and Teisberg 2006). Reformers might
also be looking to healthcare systems internationally, which seem to be achieving
better outcomes at lower costs while demonstrating that they are further down the
health IT adoption path (Schoen et al. 2006). Indeed, to the extent health IT crosses
patient- and context-specific data with current information on best practices, it could
be part of the solution to many of healthcare’s apparent inefficiencies. For example,
physicians could leverage context-sensitive best practice alerts toward the preven-
tion or escalation of chronic diseases, the treatment costs of which account for over
80 percent of the nation’s annual healthcare bill (Anderson and Knickman 2001).
According to one account, “solid medical science” makes clear, for example, that
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for those who have suffered a heart attack, the administration of inexpensive beta
blockers would reduce their likelihood of a second heart attack by more than 40
percent. However, only about 60 percent of those that should be on beta blockers
actually are (Halvorson and Isham 2003). Even when providers are aware of best
practices, they lack the requisite information to seek-out at-risk patients and to de-
liver preventive treatment. As a result, best practice compliance rates sit at just 55
percent (McGlynn et al. 2003). Finally, significant savings accrue from reductions
in the “utilization of care” (Chaudhry et al. 2006). That is, the adoption of health
IT reduces demand for unnecessary or duplicative diagnostic and laboratory services
(Garrido et al. 2005). It also allows for the substitution of lower-cost telephone and
secure messaging encounters for more costly, in-person office visits (Zhou et al. 2007).
In short, one might expect health IT to improve patient health as well as the
allocation of physician-provided care. In this way, doctors’ use of health IT could
improve the overall, economic efficiency of the industry. Nonetheless, the diffusion
of non-hospital health IT generally hovers below 20 percent, particularly for com-
prehensive and integrated health IT systems (e.g., Burt and Sisk 2005, DesRoches
et al. 2008). An analysis of physicians’ reported access to the technology reveals
a connection between the technology’s anticipated benefits and its adoption, a link
that can be explained in the context of Griliches’s (1957) seminal work on the dif-
fusion of new technologies. Hybrid corn, the focal innovation in Griliches’s analysis,
proved superior in a number of ways to conventional, “open-pollination” seed, yet
many farmers continued using the inferior product for many years after the first ap-
pearance of the new technology. He used government data to establish the notion
of “expected profitability” as a driver of technology adoption, a theory further for-
malized by Mansfield (1961) and incorporated into diffusion studies of many other
technologies including industrial automation (Mansfield 1989) and automated teller
machines (ATMs) (Saloner and Shepard 1995). This subsequent empirical work fo-
cused on adopter heterogeneity as a driver of adoption patterns. While this construct
understandably differs by context, Hall and Khan (2003) underline the need to ex-
amine the benefits received and the costs incurred by the would-be adopter as key
determinants of adoption behavior. Applying this line of thought to the adoption
context surrounding health IT clarifies the reasons for slow diffusion. It also suggests
the type of policies that could hasten not only adoption of the technology itself,
but the realization of the efficiency goals intended of the technology. In the case of
health IT, structural characteristics of the industry drive a wedge between the ben-
efits of health IT as seen by physicians and the benefits perceived by policymakers
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considering society-at-large.
A. Benefits of Health IT to Physicians
Summing across the avenues by which health IT could help physicians keep pa-
tients healthy, one can begin to envisage the sizable efficiency gains anticipated by
policymakers. However, just how these benefits are partitioned influences adoption
patterns. In the case of hybrid corn, industrial robots, or ATMs, the investing farmer,
factory, or bank, respectively, expected to recoup the returns on the investment, net
of the benefits captured by other parties such as workers or customers. This is not
necessarily the case with primary care medicine. Who benefits from adopting health
IT depends on how the healthcare being provided is actually financed.
Suppose the marginal cost of health IT to physician i is Ci, that total benefits are
represented by V , and that the share of benefits accruing to the investing physician
is represented by φi such that 0 ≤ φi ≤ 1. Then the total value arising from a
physician’s investment in health IT is represented by
Ci = φiV + (1− φi)V . (1)
If, in fact, the investing physician’s practice could internalize all of the benefits
arising from the technology, then φi = 1, and the second term drops out of Equation
1 entirely. On the other hand, if φi < 1, then the second term drives a wedge between
marginal benefits and marginal costs. Therefore, the physician will only invest in
health IT up to the point at which Ci = φiV , yielding an equilibrium level of health
IT investment that is systematically and strictly less than would be the case in the
absence of external economies—conceptualized as (1− φi)V .
B. Healthcare Financing Model
There is good reason to suspect that φ̂ < 1. Many of the benefits believed to
arise from health IT investments accrue to someone other than the physician or her
medical practice.1 One critical determinant of whether or not physicians benefit
from health IT investment is the model under which their medical practice finances
the care it delivers—fee-for-service (FFS) or prepaid. Under the conventional, FFS
model, medical practice organizations deliver patient care by contracting with mul-
tiple health plans that indemnify the provider on a claim-by-claim basis according
1Walker et al.’s (2005) study of the benefits of one particular form of health IT, computerized
ordering, implies a value for φ̂ of approximately .11.
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to pre-negotiated rules regarding which procedures are covered and at what rate the
practice will be reimbursed (Cutler, McClellan, and Newhouse 2000). Organizations
profit as residual claimants on each of these payments. Consequently, these prac-
tices benefit from providing the services of each claim as efficiently as possible and
from generating as many reimbursable claims as possible, with an emphasis on those
treatments that leave more claims revenue in excess of costs. Under the prepaid or
“capitated” model, on the other hand, the medical practice internalizes the risk of
its patient population, effectively assuming the role of health insurer in addition to
its role as healthcare provider. It does this by charging a per-member, per-month
premium from which it finances all required care. Under this model, practices profit
as residual claimants on the monthly premium.2
Some of the returns to health IT investments accrue to physicians and their med-
ical practices irrespective of the model under which they finance care, namely cost
reductions associated with a reduced need to locate, retrieve, deliver, and refile paper
charts as well as reduced demand for transcription services. There are even savings
that accrue exclusively to those under the FFS model. For example, the use of com-
puters could allow organizations to “capture” revenues from procedures that were
performed, but undocumented in the course of an office visit (Wang et al. 2003), as
well as from claimable procedures that the provider may have overlooked altogether
(Walker et al. 2005). However, I argue that most of the benefits arising from health
IT investments accrue only to practices operating under the prepaid model.
Health IT improves the coordination of care by providing physicians with infor-
mation gathered by the patient’s other providers as well as deep and rich historical
data on the patient (Halvorson and Isham 2003)—information that may or may not
be available in a conventional paper record, but would certainly require greater re-
sources to locate. Along the same lines, IT-enabled advances promote best practices,
including the substitution of cheaper preventive measures for much more costly treat-
ment efforts. In all of these ways, the patient and society-at-large benefit from the
health IT-engendered reallocation of healthcare resources. However, with respect to
2The capitated model can itself be divided into “sub-models” based on the structure linking
the provision and insurance functions. In some cases, the physicians and support staff literally
work for the same organization that markets health plans to groups or individuals in addition to
employing doctors to care for patients. Other medical practices falling under the same financing
model instead contract with one or more separate entities that market health plans. It follows
that those physicians delivering care according to the latter arrangement do not work directly for
a health insurer; however, because these medical practices finance care with a pre-negotiated, per-
member, per-month prepayment, doctors in this setting work for an organization that has assumed
the role of health insurer, at least with respect to the internalization of risk.
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medical practices, only those financing care on a prepaid basis share in these ben-
efits. And, only those practices expecting to appropriate these benefits should be
expected to invest in these technologies. That is, physician i’s anticipated value for
φ will be greater when she is affiliated with a practice that finances care through
the capitated model. Therefore, she will be more likely to adopt health IT than a
similarly-situated physician financing care under the traditional model.
III. Empirical Evidence
I use data from the Community Tracking Study (CTS) to show that the financing
model under which a physician’s practice operates predicts his or her access to health
IT. The CTS is administered by the Center for Studying Health System Change (2003,
2006) and sponsored by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. It allows us to mea-
sure health IT diffusion as far back as 2001, long before the start of the present
policy push for EHR adoption. The 2001 and 2005 cross-sections include data from
8,665 distinct PCPs. Table 1 explains the construction of variables. The top half
shows measures of health IT adoption. Each of seven IT applications—writing pre-
scriptions (ITPresc), communicating with patients (ITComm), researching treat-
ment information and guidelines (ITTreat), checking the contents of the formulary
(ITForm), generating reminders for preventative services (ITRemind), accessing
patient notes (ITNotes), and exchanging clinical data and images with other physi-
cians (ITClin)—is first measured independently with a binary variable equal to one
for an affirmative response. I then sum affirmative responses to measure the intensity
with which a physician’s medical practice adopts IT, captured in the variable ITUse.
[Table 1 about here.]
The rest of Table 1 outlines the construction of the independent variables. The
variable PrePaid captures the financing model underpinning healthcare delivery at
the respondent’s medical practice. The use of a binary indicator based on a practice’s
designation as an Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) sets up a conservative
test of the theory since it captures only those practices that finance all care on a
prepaid basis. Of course, the healthcare financing model is of special, substantive
importance here. As I will argue, the adoption encouraged by the prepaid model is
the kind of adoption that puts the technology in the hands of the very physicians
that can most benefit from its effective use and whose effective use helps to deliver
the goals that policymakers intend for it. Nonetheless, there are other drivers of
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health IT adoption that must be controlled for in order to identify the adoption
effects of the reimbursement model. First among these is the size of a physician’s
medical practice. Previous empirical examinations of the diffusion of health IT find
that small medical practices are much less likely to embrace the technology than
are larger ones (e.g., DesRoches et al. 2008, Gans et al. 2005). There are a number
of reasons why this may be. David (1975) and Saloner and Shepard (1995) each
show that large-scale production enables investing firms to make more intensive use
of new technologies. An alternative theory rests on a large organization’s ability to
experiment with process changes in a single part of the production process while
continuing to rely on incumbent technologies for most production needs (Hall and
Khan 2003). Accounting for the number of physicians in a practice —OrgSize—
probably picks up unobserved medical practice characteristics whose exclusion, if
anything, renders the point estimates on PrePaid more conservative than they
might otherwise be.
There are additional factors to control for in identifying the impact of the re-
imbursement model. One might expect the scope of services offered by a physi-
cian’s medical practice to dictate the degree to which the practice benefits from
investments in health IT, with organizations offering more types of medical services
better-positioned to capitalize on the technology’s coordination benefits. Therefore,
the dummy variable OrgScope indicates whether or not a practice offers speciality
care in addition to primary care. Region, cast as a set of binary variables, con-
trols for urban/regional differences in adoption patterns. Finally, the models include
controls for two physician-level demographic characteristics. Female is a binary
variable measuring the sex of the respondent, and Age is a continuous variable
reflecting the respondent’s age in years at the time the survey was administered.
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for all but the binary dependent variables in Ta-
ble 1. Not surprisingly, mean adoption levels rose between the two survey rounds
(p < .001). In both survey rounds, the stringent operationalization of the variable
PrePaid ensures that a relatively small share of physicians—five percent—meet the
threshold.
[Table 2 about here.]
Figure 1 expresses mean adoption levels—by year—for each of the individual
health IT applications. As in the case of the aggregate intensity variable, observed
adoption for each of its constituent, dichotomous components also grew between 2001
8
and 2005 (p < .001 in all seven cases).3
[Figure 1 about here.]
I test the theory described in Section II with four linear models. I first estimate
the intensity of health IT adoption—physicians’ reported access to health IT—using
both OLS and GLS frameworks. I then use the same two-pronged approach to model
probabilities of adoption for the individual IT uses described in Table 1.
Consider first the cross-sectional estimation of ITUse for each medical practice
i.
ITUsei = β0 + βPrePaidPrePaidi
+ βcontrolscontrolsi + ǫi
(2)
where β0 is a constant, βcontrols is a vector of slope coefficients for the control
variables—OrgSize, OrgScope, Female, Age, and a set of dummy indicators
for Region, and ǫi is a zero-expectation error term. βPrePaid is the parameter of
interest. According to the theory espoused above, it should be positively signed.4
Estimates of the probability of a medical practice’s adoption of any of the seven
individual forms of health IT are derived using probit regression. For each of the
dichotomous dependent variables,
Pr(ITi = 1) = Φ(β0 + βPrePaidPrePaidi
+ βcontrolscontrolsi)
(3)
where Φ is the cumulative normal distribution, so Pr(ITi = 1) is the probability
that physician i’s medical practice provides its physicians access to a particular form
of health IT.5
Our access to two waves of CTS data allows us to exploit the panel nature of the
data using GLS (Baltagi 2005). The multilevel analog to the cross-sectional estimates
3Note that reported adoption levels are higher than in those existing studies intended to measure
the adoption of integrated, interoperable EHR systems (e.g., Bower 2005, DesRoches et al. 2008,
Gans et al. 2005, Jha et al. 2006).
4Since the dependent variable is actually an ordered categorical variable, an ordered probit
regression would be more appropriate than OLS regressions. In all cases, results from ordered probits
were qualitatively identical to OLS estimates. For ease of interpretation, I report OLS estimates.
5Though Equation 3 is estimated separately for each of the seven dummy dependent variables,
Cappellari and Jenkins (2003) suggest a more complex joint estimator to capture the between-
equation covariances. These estimates yield identical estimates and significance levels while allowing
us to properly test coefficients across the seven equations simultaneously.
9
of health IT intensity, Equation 2, is
ITUseit = β2001 + β2005 + βPrePaidPrePaidit
+ βcontrolscontrolsit + ζi + ǫit .
(4)
Equation 4 estimates two constant terms, one for each survey round, to ensure that
point estimates can be interpreted relative to the mean for that particular round
of data. Second, the multilevel model partitions the error term into two, zero-
expectation terms. ζi represents the part of the residual that is specific to each
medical practice i and constant across both observations of medical practice i for
those medical practices that appear in both the 2001 and 2005 survey waves. The
second error term, ǫit, is assumed to be independent over all individual observations
of each physician, nit, in the dataset. Likewise, Equation 3 can be recast to exploit
the added information contained in panel data.
Pr(ITit = 1) = Φ(β2001 + β2005 + βPrePaidPrePaidit
+ βcontrolscontrolsit + ζi) .
(5)
As in the continuous case, the intercept has been allowed to vary between rounds,
yielding β2001 and β2005 as opposed to a single constant term, β0. The multilevel
model includes a single, zero-expectation error term, ζi, allowing us to relax the
conditional independence assumption.
[Table 3 about here.]
Table 3 presents the first set of estimation results. All three models predict the
level of health IT adoption in a primary care physician’s practice as a function of the
practice’s financing model, controlling for size, scope, respondent demographics, and
practice location.6 Models 1 and 2 are each estimates of Equation 2, the former run
on the 2001 cross-section and the latter run on the 2005 cross-section. Focusing on
Model 1, β̂PrePaid = 1.26 implies that net of the effects of the other covariates—most
importantly, OrgSize—those physicians based in a practice that finances care on a
prepaid basis will, on average, report that their practice has invested in about one and
a quarter more uses of health IT than those physicians based in practices financing
6Each model also includes a goodness-of-fit measure; however, this number has little meaning
given the true, discrete nature of the dependent variable (Aldrich and Nelson 1984). Recall from
Footnote 4 that OLS models offer ease of interpretation and unbiased point estimates. However, the
conventional model R2 assumes that the dependent variable can take on any value, which in this
case, it cannot.
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care according to the traditional, fee-for-service model. The 2005 estimates, reported
under Model 2, are qualitatively similar to those found for 2001. Once again, those
physicians financing care on a prepaid basis are more intense adopters of health IT
than those financing care in the traditional manner.
The last column in Table 3 displays the estimates of Equation 4. These rely on
a GLS technique that allows us to take advantage of the larger sample size achieved
by pooling the two rounds of data without violating standard assumptions regarding
independence and homoscedasticity. Once again, PrePaid is positively correlated
with the intensity of health IT adoption in a physician’s practice. In this case, those
physicians providing care on a prepaid basis report, on average, access to 1.13 more
forms of IT in their offices than those physicians based in otherwise identical medical
practices that finance care according to the traditional model.
[Table 4 about here.]
[Table 5 about here.]
Table 4 presents 2001 survey estimates of the seven, binary IT adoption variables.
Note that in all models, the point estimate corresponding to the variable PrePaid is
positive and statistically significant at conventional levels. Therefore, in all cases, net
of the effects of the measured variables, those doctors whose practices finance care
on a prepaid basis are more likely to report access to all seven forms of IT than those
whose practices finance care on a fee-for-service basis. To be more specific, consider
the estimate of β̂PrePaid = .53 in the model predicting the adoption of IT for writing
prescriptions. The point estimate implies that with the other variables held at their
means, the probability that a physician reports access to e-prescribing technology
is 13 percent higher under prepayment than under fee-for-service.7 The 2005 cross-
sectional estimates of the same model appear in Table 5 and are similar to those
found for the 2001 data. That is, all seven of the technologies appear to be positively
related to the use of the prepaid financing model, though two of these estimates—
ITComm and ITTreat—fall short of statistical significance. Nonetheless, a test of
the joint significance of the point estimates for PrePaid clarifies its significance as
a predictor of adoption.8
7Since prepayment is operationalized as a binary variable, this calculation is obtained by differ-
encing predicted probabilities from Equation 3 at PrePaid = 1 and PrePaid = 0.
8Recall from Footnote 5 that the seven probit equations for each year, while presented as in-
dependent models, were also estimated jointly to account for between-equation covariances. With
respect to β̂PrePaid, the results are consistent with those presented here (χ
2 = 37.24, p < .0000).
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[Table 6 about here.]
Table 6 shows random effects probit estimates for the seven separate technologies,
represented above by Equation 5. Using the pooled data, it is again clear that those
physicians whose practices finance care in a prepaid fashion are more likely than
doctors in otherwise similar settings to report that their practices have adopted all
seven of the measured forms of health IT.
In the net, the above analyses offer strong support for the theory. In all cases,
those physicians whose practices finance care on a prepaid basis were more intense
adopters of health IT and more likely to adopt IT for all seven individual functions
than those doctors working under a conventional, FFS reimbursement system. Most
important, the effects of the financing model were detectable despite the strong effects
of medical practice size.
IV. Conclusion
The diffusion of health IT stands at the center of most prescriptions for healthcare
reform in the US (e.g., Daschle, Greenberger, and Lambrew 2008, Halvorson 2007).
This makes sense to the extent one believes that the transition from paper-based
record-keeping to IT-driven business processes can deliver sizable efficiencies, mainly
through the reallocation of healthcare resources. This paper examines the drivers
of health IT adoption for primary care physicians. It finds that despite concerns
about slow uptake, some physicians—those based in practices most likely to inter-
nalize the technology’s benefits—are predictably more likely than others to report
access to health IT—even as far back as 2001. When combined with what we know
about organizations and IT—that the technology’s performance benefits require ad-
ditional investments on the part of would-be users, these results have implications for
policymakers wishing to parlay the adoption of this technology into industry-wide
performance improvements.
Earlier studies demonstrate that what were once thought to be IT-driven per-
formance improvements were more accurately ascribed not to the technology itself,
but to investments in human and organizational capital, e.g., training and the reor-
ganization of work (e.g., Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2003, Brynjolfsson, Hitt, and Yang
2002), that must take place alongside investments in IT. Consequently, the findings
in this paper do not question the potential for policy reforms to generate measurable
changes in technology adoption patterns (Acemoglu and Finkelstein 2008). Rather,
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they suggest that policies aimed solely at reducing the cost of hardware and soft-
ware to physicians are more likely to succeed at hastening the spread of health IT
among primary care physicians than they are to actually bring about the kinds of
organizational-level performance improvements that aggregate into greater economic
efficiency at the industry level.
One option for policymakers would be to incentivize not just the adoption of hard-
ware and software, but also the adoption of a prescribed set of known organizational
complements. This is essentially what is behind the requirement for “meaningful
use” as embodied in the HITECH Act. Thought its precise meaning has yet to be
hammered out in regulations, it is likely to involve the use of IT for specific tasks, in-
cluding the seven examined explicitly above. For example, it could be that in order to
qualify for their full complement of incentive payments through the stimulus package,
physicians must demonstrate that they are “e-prescribing” (operationalized above as
ITPresc) rather than handwriting orders for prescription drugs. This approach,
though, would be imperfect relative to one that clears the way for medical practices
and their physicians to realize gains from their investments in health IT. Under the
approach suggested in this paper, only those practices that anticipate gains would
invest in the technology, and would do so up to the point at which marginal revenues
reach marginal costs. Furthermore, practices would invest in the specific technologies
from which they expect to draw value and would invest in the specific complemen-
tary investments required for their particular organization to make effective use of
their particular bundle of IT investments. In other words, medical practices would
be the residual claimants on potentially boundless returns to health IT investments,
and would have every incentive to mobilize the technology and its organizational
complements towards achieving the very efficiencies intended of the technology.
An equally important set of issues concerns this link between the deployment
of health IT in the form of integrated, EHR systems and measurable performance
improvements, a full understanding of which requires a more-detailed analysis of
incentives within managed care organizations (Gaynor, Rebitzer, and Taylor 2004).
The conclusions presented here could also be strengthened and extended by demon-
strating that early adopters—in this case, those adopting because they are posi-
tioned to internalize the benefits of the adoption—are both more likely to report
investments in complements such as workflow redesign and more likely to report re-
sulting performance improvements than those physicians adopting chiefly as a result
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Figure 1: Physicians’ Reported Access to Seven Health IT Applications
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Source: Author’s analysis of data from rounds 3 and 4 of the Community Tracking Study Physician
Survey (Center for Studying Health System Change 2003, 2006).
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Table 1: Descriptions of Independent and Dependent Variables
Variable Name Description & Construction
Dependent Variables
ITUse Intensity of IT use by the practice, constructed by summing
values for seven measured IT uses. (discrete, ordered variable
ranging from zero to seven)
ITPresc ...to write prescriptions?”
ITComm “In your practice, are computers or other forms of IT used...
(binary = 1 for “yes”)
...to communicate about clinical issues with patients by
email?”
ITTreat ...to obtain information about treatment alternatives or
recommended guidelines?”
ITForm ...to obtain information on formularies?”
ITRemind ...to generate reminders for you about preventative services?”
ITNotes ...to access patient notes, medication lists, or problem lists?”
ITClin ...for clinical data and image exchanges with other
physicians?”
Independent Variables
PrePaid Medical practice serves as an HMO (binary = 1 for “yes”)
OrgSize “How many physicians, including yourself, are in this
practice?” (continuous variable)
OrgScope Medical practice offers primary and speciality care. (binary =
1 for “yes”)
Control Variables
Female Respondent’s sex (binary = 1 for “female”)
Age Respondent’s age, measured as the difference between the year
of the survey and physician’s year of birth (continuous
variable)
Region Regional population (categorical = 1 for “large metropolitan
area/population > 200,000”, 2 for “small metropolitan
area/population < 200,000”, and 3 for “non-metropolitan
area”; operationalized as dummy variables in estimated
models)
Source: Variables constructed from rounds 3 and 4 of the Community Tracking Study Physician
Survey conducted by the Center for Studying Health System Change (2003, 2006).
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
2001 Survey 2005 Survey
variable mean std. dev. mean std. dev.
ITUse 2.0 1.9 2.8 2.0
PrePaid .05 .22 .05 .22
OrgSize 36.6 130.4 43.4 145.5
OrgScope .09 .29 .09 .28
Female .32 .47 .35 .48
Age 46.4 10.7 47.7 10.7
Region 1.2 .64 1.3 .69
n 7,673 - 3,291 -
Source: Variables constructed from rounds 3 and 4 of the
Community Tracking Study Physician Survey conducted by
the Center for Studying Health System Change (2003, 2006).
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Table 3: Estimates of IT Adoption Levels
Model 1: Model 2: Model 3:
OLS OLS GLS
2001 cross-section 2005 cross-section pooled cross-section
PrePaid 1.26∗∗∗ .95∗∗∗ 1.13∗∗∗
(11.60) (5.19) (10.17)
OrgSize .23∗∗∗ .38∗∗∗ .25∗∗∗
(13.25) (13.95) (15.89)
OrgScope .17∗ −.11 .14
(2.23) (-0.85) (1.95)
Female −.27∗∗∗ −.26∗∗ −.25∗∗∗
(-5.37) (-3.30) (-5.66)
Age −.01∗∗ −.01∗∗∗ −.01∗∗∗
(-3.08) (-3.87) (-4.54)
Region2 .15 .36∗ .22
(1.12) (1.98) (1.95)
Region3 .11 .12 .08
(1.52) (1.08) (1.32)
R2 .10 .14 .15
n 6,511 2,786 9,297
clusters - - 7,471
Key: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
Notes: The dependent variable is ITUse. Models 1 and 2 report t-statistics in parentheses, and
Model 3 instead reports z-statistics. Significance tests performed using Huber-White standard errors
for Model 3. Model 3 includes a dummy variable equal to unity for those observations from the 2005
survey round, allowing the (unreported) intercept to account for increases in mean IT adoption levels
between 2001 and 2005.
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Table 4: Probit Regression Estimates of the Probability of IT Adoption in 2001
ITPresc ITComm ITTreat ITForm ITRemind ITNotes ITClin
PrePaid .53∗∗∗ .27∗∗ .20∗ .74∗∗∗ .55∗∗∗ .83∗∗∗ .37∗∗∗
(6.08) (3.28) (2.50) (9.48) (7.06) (10.40) (4.67)
OrgSize .63∗∗∗ .12∗∗∗ .07∗∗∗ .05∗∗∗ .06∗∗∗ .15∗∗∗ .18∗∗∗
(4.18) (8.81) (5.80) (4.20) (4.37) (11.70) (14.00)
OrgScope .12 −.003 −.09 .12∗ .04 .25∗∗∗ .13∗
(1.81) (-0.05) (-1.72) (2.11) (0.65) (4.62) (2.43)
Female −.23∗∗∗ −.12∗∗ −.11∗∗ −.08∗ −.09∗ −.17∗∗∗ −.12∗∗
(-4.89) (-2.80) (-3.24) (-2.19) (-2.25) (-4.34) (-3.24)
Age −.01∗∗∗ −.002 −.01∗∗∗ .003 .003 −.004∗ −.003
(-3.97) (-0.84) (-7.56) (1.70) (1.84) (-2.36) (-1.94)
Region2 −.04 −.12 .21∗ −.06 .05 .18 .17
(0.32) (-1.05) (2.19) (-0.54) (0.46) (1.83) (1.78)
Region3 −.03 −.08 .23∗∗∗ −.04 .08 .08 .01
(-0.44) (-1.34) (4.52) (-0.66) (1.55) (1.55) (0.20)
n 6,547 6,544 6,542 6,537 6,540 6,546 6,540
χ2 174.8 200.5 181.5 230.8 153.0 621.2 484.3
Key: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
Notes: Column names represent the dependent variable for each model. Table reports coefficients and z-statistics from probit models.
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Table 5: Probit Regression Estimates of the Probability of IT Adoption in 2005
ITPresc ITComm ITTreat ITForm ITRemind ITNotes ITClin
PrePaid .35∗∗∗ .24 .13 .35∗∗ .56∗∗∗ .58∗∗∗ .45∗∗∗
(2.85) (1.89) (0.94) (2.77) (4.48) (4.38) (3.37)
OrgSize .16∗∗∗ .13∗∗∗ .13∗∗∗ .13∗∗∗ .11∗∗∗ .19∗∗∗ .23∗∗∗
(8.31) (6.94) (6.92) (7.08) (5.91) (10.10) (12.30)
OrgScope −.08 −.16 −.18 −.11 −.05 .13 .05
(-0.83) (-1.63) (-1.90) (-1.23) (-0.51) (1.42) (0.51)
Female −.12∗ −.13∗ −.07 −.03 −.10 −.24∗∗∗ −.08
(-2.07) (-2.13) (-1.36) (-0.61) (-1.85) (-4.38) (-1.48)
Age −.01∗∗∗ −.003 −.01∗∗∗ .0001 .0001 −.01∗∗∗ −.003
(-4.79) (-1.03) (-6.00) (0.03) (0.28) (-4.20) (-1.24)
Region2 .31∗ −.01 .06 .20 .08 .24 .06
(2.48) (-0.05) (0.47) (1.67) (0.65) (1.94) (0.53)
Region3 .02 −.14 .11 .06 .09 .12 .05
(0.23) (-1.64) (1.45) (0.71) (1.26) (1.66) (0.72)
n 2,814 2,811 2,811 2,805 2,804 2,812 2,809
χ2 201.6 110.1 133.3 113.7 122.0 312.8 324.0
Key: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
Notes: Column names represent the dependent variable for each model. Table reports coefficients and z-statistics from probit models.
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Table 6: Random Effects Probit Regression Estimates of the Probability of IT Adoption
ITPresc ITComm ITTreat ITForm ITRemind ITNotes ITClin
PrePaid .47∗∗∗ .40∗∗∗ .23∗ .79∗∗∗ .78∗∗∗ 1.18∗∗∗ .52∗∗∗
(6.32) (3.60) (2.38) (8.77) (7.71) (10.20) (5.64)
OrgSize .11∗∗∗ .19∗∗∗ .12∗∗∗ .10∗∗∗ .10∗∗∗ .24∗∗∗ .24∗∗∗
(8.33) (9.77) (7.98) (7.02) (6.30) (13.10) (16.00)
OrgScope .06 −.04 −.15∗ .10 .05 .36∗∗∗ .15∗
(1.12) (-0.49) (-2.21) (1.41) (0.65) (4.88) (2.49)
Female −.19∗∗∗ −.19∗∗∗ −.14∗∗ −.08 −.13∗∗ −.28∗∗∗ −.14∗∗∗
(-4.95) (-3.31) (-3.15) (-1.91) (-2.63) (-5.31) (-3.40)
Age −.01∗∗∗ −.003 −.02∗∗∗ .002 .004 −.01∗∗∗ −.005∗
(-5.95) (-1.19) (-8.89) (1.31) (1.70) (-4.02) (-2.49)
Region2 .13 −.13 .21 .06 .08 .31∗ .18
(1.37) (-0.88) (1.85) (0.59) (0.67) (2.50) (1.74)
Region3 −.01 −.18∗ .26∗∗∗ −.01 .11 .12 .03
(-0.26) (-2.14) (4.11) (-0.18) (1.67) (1.72) (0.48)
n 9,361 9,355 9,353 9,342 9,344 9,358 9,349
clusters 7,516 7,510 7,509 7,503 7,504 7,513 7,506
χ2 510.2 207.3 345.5 425.5 222.6 440.5 469.3
Key: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
Notes: Column names represent the dependent variable for each model. Table reports coefficients and z-statistics from random effects probit models,
with significance tests performed using Huber-White standard errors. All models include an intercept term and a dummy variable equal to unity for
those observations from the 2005 survey round, allowing the (unreported) intercept to account for increases in mean IT adoption levels between 2001
and 2005.
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